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I. Introduction: McCleskey v. Kemp
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of
McCleskey v. Kemp.' In that case, a black male defendant was convicted of
two counts of armed robbery and murder. The victim was a white male.
McCleskey, from a Fulton County, Georgia jail, sought relief from his death
sentence on the basis that the Georgia sentencing process was administered
in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.2 McCleskey supported his claim with
a statistical study indicating that the death penalty in Georgia was imposed
more often on black defendants and killers of white victims than on white
defendants and killers of black victims.
3
The study, conducted by Professors David Baldus, Charles Pulaski,
and George Woodworth, was based on an examination of over 2,000 murder
cases that occurred in Georgia during the 1970s.4 According to the study,
Associate, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky; J.D., Washington and Lee School of Law,
May 2005; B.A. Washington and Lee University, 2002.
1 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
2 Id. at 291-319.
3 Id at 292-93.
4 Id. at 286.
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defendants charged with killing white persons received' the death penalty in
11%. of the cases, but defendants charged with killing blacks received the
death penalty in only 1% of the cases. 5 Further, prosecutors sought the death
penalty in 70% of the cases involving black defendants and white victims,
but a death sentence was sought in only 19% of cases involving white
defendants and black victims.
6
The authors of the study attempted to account for 230 variables that
could have explained the disparities on nonracial grounds.7  Even after
taking into account these variables, the study concluded that defendants
charged with killing white victims were significantly more likely to receive a
death sentence than defendants charged with killing blacks, and black
defendants as a whole were more likely to receive a death sentence than
other defendants.
McCleskey argued that the study indicated that black defendants
who killed white victims had the greatest likelihood of receiving the death
penalty. 9 As the Court stated, his claim of discrimination extended "to every
actor in the Georgia capital sentencing process, from the prosecutor who
sought the death penalty and the jury that imposed the sentence, to the state
itself that enacted the capital punishment statute and allows it to -remain in
effect despite its allegedly discriminatory application." 10
In an opinion authored by Justice Lewis Powell, the majority
rejected McCleskey's claims, stating that the study failed to establish that
any of the decision makers in McCleskey's case acted with discriminatory
purpose in violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Further, the study at
most indicated a discrepancy that appeared merely to correlate with race, not
"a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting Georgia's capital
sentencing process."' 12 The Court stated that every mode for determining
guilt or punishment has weaknesses and the potential for misuse. 13 Despite
such imperfections, constitutional guarantees are met when the mode for
determining guilt or punishment is surrounded with safeguards to make it as
fair as possible. 14 Therefore, the study demonstrated no constitutional
violation. 15
5 Id.




10 Id. at 292.
1 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987).
12 Id. at 312-13.
13 Id. at 313.
14 Id. (quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965)).
15 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313.
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In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan wrote that the majority
"seems to fear too much justice." 16 He argued that the majority's
unwillingness to view McCleskey's statistical evidence as sufficient to
support a claim of racial discrimination stemmed from a fear that such
recognition might lead to widespread challenges to all aspects of criminal
sentencing. 17 In Brennan's view, the prospect that there might be
widespread abuses in criminal sentencing was no excuse for the Court's
abdication of its judicial role of preventing the arbitrary administration of
punishment. 18
11. The Congressional Aftermath of McCleskey
The McCleskey decision prompted the introduction of the Racial
Justice Act (RJA) in Congress. 19 The proposal, which was first introduced in
the House of Representatives in 1988 by Representative John Conyers of
Michigan, would have permitted defendants sentenced to death to challenge
those sentences using the type of statistical proof of racial discrimination
presented in the Baldus study.20 After failing to pass in 1988, a version of
the RJA subsequently passed the House in 1990 as part of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1990, but was dropped by the
conference committee.2' In 1991, the RJA was introduced in the House22
and the Senate,23 but was defeated in both chambers.24 The proposal again
passed the House in 1994, by a vote of 217-212.25 However, the proposal
died in conference during a highly publicized national debate over President
Clinton's crime bill.26
Several versions of the RJA appeared before Congress between 1988
and 1994.27 The provisions of the various versions were essentially the same
insofar as they responded to McCleskey by prohibiting imposition of the
16 Id. at 339.
17 Id.
]a Id.
19 H.R. 4442, 100th Cong. (2d Sess. 1988).
20 Id
21 H.R. 5269, 101stCong. (2d Sess. 1990).
22 H.R. 1249, 102d Cong. (1st Sess. 1991).
23 H.R. 2851, 102d Cong. (lst Sess. 1991).
24 137 CONG. REc. S8300 (daily ed. June 20, 1991). Clifford Krauss, House Approves Anti-
Crime Bill with Something for Both Camps, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1991, at Al, A18.
25 H.R. 4017, 103d Cong. (2d Sess. 1994). This version of the RJA was the same as the proposal
contained in the 1991 House bill.
26 Naftali Bendavid, Black Lawmakers Hold Balance on Crime; Legislative Endgame Reveals
Caucus's Power, Divisions, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 22, 1994, at 1; Harvey Berkman, Race and Death Stymie
Crime Bill, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 1, 1994, at A 1l.
27 See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text (discussing the introduction and subsequent
defeat of proposed bills designed to eliminate racial discrimination in applying the death penalty).
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28death penalty unless it was applied in a race-neutral manner. Under the
RJA, a defendant could challenge a death sentence by showing that race
played a statistically significant role in capital sentencing in the jurisdiction
in which he was tfied. 29 Specifically, a defendant could show that the race of
either defendants or victims had affected past death sentencing decisions in
the jurisdiction where the crime was committed.3 ° Upon such a showing, the
proposal shifted the burden to state and federal authorities, who would have
to demonstrate that any racial disparities in sentencing were "clearly and
convincingly" explained by nonracial factors. 31 Thus, the bill would have
created substantial procedural obstacles to the imposition of capital
punishment at both the federal and state levels.
Over the years, the provisions of the RJA changed slightly. "In
general, the changes reveal a pattern: a consistent watering down of the
proposal so as to bar fewer death sentences and make it easier for the
government to defeat claims of discrimination. 3 2 For example, originally,
the government had the burden to rebut the petitioner's prima facie case of
discrimination by clear and convincing evidence.33 The 1994 proposal only
required the government to rebut by a preponderance of the evidence.34
Another minor alteration involved data collection requirements. The original
version required all federal and state law enforcement jurisdictions to collect
data on capital crimes and make it available to legal counsel.35 The 1994
version did not require public officials to collect any data, but required
whatever data was collected to be made available to the public.36
Of all of the attempts to pass the RJA through Congress, 1994
presented the best opportunity because of efforts made over the years to
water down the legislation in order to garner greater support. The proposal
engendered strong opposition, however, and politics ultimately defeated it.
37
Republicans strongly opposed the RJA, arguing that it would effectively
38block the imposition of death sentences altogether. Excerpts from the
Senate debate over the issue reveal strong GOP opposition:
28 H.R. 4017, 103d Cong. § 2(a) (2d Sess. 1994).
29 Id. § 2921(b).
30 Id. § 292 1(c).
31 H.R. 4442, 100th Cong. § 3(c) (2d Sess. 1988).
32 Paul Schoeman, Easing the Fear of Too Much Justice: A Compromise Proposal to Revise the
Racial Justice Act, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 543, 552 (1995).




37 Bill McCollum, The Struggle for Effective Anti-Crime Legislation - An Analysis of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, http://www.saf.org/LawReviews/McCollum1.htm (last
visited Oct. 17, 2005).
38 Id.
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Mr. President, I have been a judge and a practicing
attorney. It has always been my understanding that individuals are
tried on the facts of his or her case, not on the facts, circumstances
or statistics from unrelated cases. This has been a fundamental
precept in our criminal justice system. Passage of the so-called
Racial Justice Act would relegate the outcome of capital cases to
statistical assertions from other unrelated capital cases. Needless
to say, the focus of the trial should be whether the defendant
committed the offense for which he was charged and it should not
be overshadowed by statistical jousting.39
Mr. President, the Racial Justice Act is part of a long
tradition here in Congress where bad legislation is given a great-
sounding name. In some businesses, this is called false
advertising. The bottom line is that the Racial Justice Act won't
do much to advance the cause of civil rights, but it will do a great
deal to clog the courts and make the death penalty virtually
unenforceable in every jurisdiction where it is currently carried
out.
40
Those in Congress supporting the RJA argued that the use of
statistics to show that racism plays a part in sentencing was appropriate in
light of the fact that statistics could be used to show discrimination in other
areas such as with employment and housing.4' They insisted that the Act
would merely prohibit states from carrying out death sentences that were
based on racial considerations as demonstrated by evidence that the
particular case in question fits an unexplained racially discriminatory pattern:
This will not impose an undue burden on the courts. Every major
civil rights bill in modem times has allowed the use of statistics to
prove discrimination, whether in housing or employment or
education or voting for that matter. The courts have proved quite
capable of analyzing statistical evidence in each of these
situations. All that proponents of the Racial Justice Act are asking
is for Congress to grant someone sentenced to death the same
opportunity to present a discrimination claim as we have granted
to someone turned down for an apartment.
42
Opponents of the RJA countered with a proposal of their own, the
Equal Justice Act (EJA), which sought to codify safeguards against racial
39 140 CONG. REC. S5519 (daily ed. May 11, 1994) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
40 140 CONG. REC. S5520 (daily ed. May 11, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole).
41 140 CONG. REc. S5517 (daily ed. May 11, 1994) (statement of Sen. Moseley-Braun).
42 Id.
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discrimination when the defendant is charged and tried, rather than when the
defendant is sentenced.43 Democrats rejected the EJA for a myriad of
reasons, and insisted on taking the RJA to the House-Senate conference in
1994.44 The RJA was politically unpopular for the Clinton Administration,
however, and in the end, White House officials convinced members of the
Congressional Black Caucus to agree to drop the issue from the final version
of the 1994 crime bill.45 TheRJA has not resurfaced before Congress since
its 1994 defeat. With Republicans in control of the Congress since 1994 and
the White House since 2000, the future of the RJA before Congress remains
dubious.
IlI. The Aftermath of McCleskey in Kentucky
In 1992, a group of people in Kentucky began to advocate for a state
version of the Racial Justice Act.46 At the time, Kentucky's death row was
exclusively populated by blacks who had murdered a white person.47 That
same year, the Kentucky General Assembly. commissioned a study of all
homicides in Kentucky between 1976 and 1991.48 The study, Race and the
Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder Trials, 1976-1991: A Study of Racial
Bias as a Factor in Capital Sentencing, was conducted by Professors
Thomas Keil and Gennaro Vito of the University of Louisville.49  They
searched for racial disparity in the decisions of prosecutors who asked for the
death penalty.50 The study demonstrated that race was a factor in Kentucky
capital sentencing. 51 Specifically, the study found that "blacks accused of
killing whites had a higher average probability of being charged with capital
crimes by the prosecutor and sentenced to die by the jury than other
homicide offenders.
5 2
43 S. 1356, 103d Cong. §§ 651-55 (lst Sess. 1993).
44 McCollum, supra note 37.
43 Id.
46 See KENTUCKY DEP'T OF PUBLIC ADVOCACY, Racial Justice Act Becomes Law: Not Soft on
Crime, But Strong on Justice, 20 THE ADVOCATE: J. OF CRIM. JUST. & EDUC. 4 (July 1998),
http://dpa.state.ky.us/library/advocate/july98/Racial.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Racial
Justice] (citing the Department of Public Advocacy, the Catholic Diocese, and various civil rights
organizations).
47 Editorial, Who Gets to Death Row, KENTUCKY COURIER-JOURNAL, Mar. 7, 1996.
48 Id.
49 Thomas Keil & Gennaro Vito, Race and the Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder Trials, 1976-
1991: A Study of Racial Bias as a Factor in Capital Sentencing, 20 AM. J. GRIM. JUST. 17 (1995).
so Id.
51 Racial Justice, supra note 46; Gerald Neal, KENTUCKY DEP'T OF PUBLIC ADVOCACY, Not
Soft on Crime, But Strong on Justice: The Kentucky Racial Justice Act: A Symbol; A Statement of Legal
Principle; and a Commitment to Systematic Fundamental Fairness, 26 THE ADVOCATE: J. OF GRIM. JUST.
& EDUC. 2 (Mar. 2004).
52 Racial Justice, supra note 46.
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As of the time of the Keil-Vito study, 100% of the 33 inmates on
Kentucky's death row were there for murdering a white victim. 53 None were
there for the murder of a black victim, despite the fact that there had been
over 1,000 African-Americans murdered in Kentucky since the death penalty
was reinstated.
54
A. The Death Penalty in Kentucky
Keil and Vito began their analysis by describing the "guided
discretion" capital sentencing system in Kentucky. 55 Under that system, the
prosecutor may file a motion to seek the death penalty.5 6 The prosecutor
may not seek the death penalty unless at least one of the several aggravating
circumstances listed in the statute is present.57 Even if one of the factors is
present, the prosecutor may decline to try the case as a capital crime.58 If the
prosecution does not seek capital punishment, it cannot be imposed.59 Juries
may decide not to impose the death penalty even upon the prosecutor's
recommendation. 60 Although the Kentucky Supreme Court has stated that
the judge has "the ultimate responsibility of fixing the penalty in capital
cases," no judge in the state has ever imposed the death penalty after a jury's
recommendation for some other sentence. 6' Trial judges have, however,
imposed lesser penalties after the jury has recommended death.62
In 1986, the Kentucky legislature passed "truth-in-sentencing"
legislation that provided for a bifurcated trial in all felony cases. 63 During
the sentencing phase, the prosecution can introduce evidence concerning
parole eligibility guidelines and the prior record of the defendant, including
the nature of prior offenses and his history of incarceration. 64 "In effect, this
law empowered juries to sentence convicted offenders to a sentence of life
without parole.,
65
53 Amnesty International, Killing with Prejudice: Race and the Death Penalty in the USA, May 1,
1999, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510521999?open&of=ENG-2M4 [hereinafter
Killing with Prejudice]; Racial Justice, supra note 46.
5 Killing with Prejudice, supra note 53; Racial Justice, supra note 46.








63 Id. at 28.
6 Id.
65 Id.
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B. The Impact of Race
Keil and Vito sought to determine whether or not racial bias existed
in the 'deliberations of prosecutors and jurors in the capital sentencing
process.66 They studied a total of 956 cases, including all persons charged
and indicted, convicted, and sentenced (for murder or a lesser offense) in
Kentucky between December 22, 1976 (the effective date of the most recent
Kentucky statute governing capital punishment) and December 31, 1991.67
Out of the 956 cases, they focused on a subset of 577 cases in which
individuals met the minimum legal requirements for receiving a death
sentence and were sentenced by a jury rather than a judge.68
The study found that capital charges were sought against blacks who
killed whites in 33% of the cases, followed by whites who killed' whites in
20% of the cases, whites who killed blacks in 17% of the cases, and blacks
who killed blacks in 14% of the cases. 69 However, none of the whites who
killed blacks actually received a death sentence. 70 Blacks who killed whites
had the highest percentage of cases receiving a death sentence from the jury
(12%). 7' The authors pointed out that the impact of race upon prosecutorial
deliberations could not be justified by the presence of other legitimate factors
because those variables in the equation had been controlled.72 Likewise, the
finding that blacks who killed whites were more likely to be sentenced to die
by the jury holds, even when other important factors are controlled.73
Finally, the study suggested that the use of "truth-in-sentencing," or a life
without the possibility of parole sentencing option could be applied in a
nondiscriminatory manner.74
Keil and Vito concluded that Kentucky's system of capital
sentencing was "fraught with discrimination that defies elimination or
control," because it is often subtle and difficult to discern.75 They offered
several explanations for the findings of discrimination. First, they
suggested that punishments for crimes have been based. on the social status
of the offender and the victim. 77 "Blacks who killed whites were singled out
for death in Kentucky primarily because of social status and the threat to
66 Id. at 20.
67 Id. at21.
68 Id. at 22.
69 Id. at 25.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 26.
73 Id. at 27.
74 Id. at 28.
75 Id. 31-32.
76 Id. at 30.
77 Id.
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social structure that this crime personifies. 78  They also suggested the
possibility that Kentucky's history of racial violence against blacks created a
view that the murder of a white by a black is a particularly serious crime-a
point of view that may have become culturally ingrained. 79 They pointed to
one particularly comprehensive study of lynchings and executions in
Kentucky between 1866 and 1934, a period marked by increased political
activity by blacks.80 "Some white voters viewed this event as a direct threat
to their political and economic hegemony." Finally, the authors suggested
several reasons why Kentucky prosecutors were more likely to seek the death
penalty in cases where blacks murdered whites, including ease of conviction,
political and/or media pressure, and the greater social visibility of cases
where blacks kill whites.81 "Therefore, it may be politically advantageous
for prosecutors to seek the death penalty in such cases. 82
The data in the Kentucky study revealed systemic discrimination that
likely will rot be cured by judicial review.83 As an example, the authors
pointed to a case in which the victim was described as a "young white
woman" in the indictment.84 In that case, the defendant, a black man, was
charged with the murder of a white female during the course of a robbery.85
The defense counsel filed a motion objecting to the specification of the
victim as a "white woman" in the indictment out of fear that the
characterization would impact the jury.86 In spite of the subtle discrimination
inherent in death penalty schemes such as Kentucky's, the authors noted that
given the Supreme Court's holding in McCleskey, it was unlikely that the
Court would strike down capital punishment on the basis of social science
research.87 Therefore, any solution will need to be a legislative one.
C. Movement Towards Legislative Reform
In response to the findings of Professors Keil and Vito, the Kentucky
General Assembly first considered a state version of the Racial Justice Act in
1994, the same year in which the legislation failed for the final time in









86 Id. On March 22, 1993, the indictment against William R. Stark, Jr. was dismissed without
prejudice, reserving issues of prosecutorial misconduct by Circuit Judge William F. Stewart.
87 Id.
88 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.300-532.358 (2004).
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death penalty against a particular defendant, and allowed for the use of
statistical evidence of racial discrimination to show that race influenced the
decision to seek the death penalty in a given case. 89 The statistical data could
consist of evidence that a death sentence was sought significantly more
frequently against persons of one race, or sought more frequently against
defendants whose victims were of one race.90 If the judge found that race
was a factor, the death penalty would be barred.9' The legislature failed to
pass the bill in 1994 and in 1996, however.
92
IV The Rebirth of the Racial Justice Act in Kentucky
In 1998, Kentucky became the first state to pass the Racial Justice
Act.9 3 The passage of the bill, which was not retroactive,94 appears to be the
product of a concerted effort by the Kentucky Department of Public
Advocacy, the Catholic Diocese, and abolition and civil rights groups in the
state.95 The Act, which was sponsored by Kentucky Senator Gerald Neal of
Louisville, passed the Senate by a vote of 22-12 on February 5, 1998 after
two hours of vigorous debate.96 State Representative Jesse Crenshaw of
Lexington introduced an identical bill in the House.97 After an hour long
debate in the House and the defeat of three amendments, the Senate bill
passed by a vote of 70-23 on March 30, 1998.98 During the Senate floor
debate, Neal characterized the bill as a method of insuring that racism did not
play a role in death sentences. 99 He noted that under the Act, defendants
bore a high threshold to prove that race influenced the Commonwealth's
decision to seek the death penalty.' 00
Opponents of the legislation argued that the bill was "soft on




92 Racial Justice, supra note 46.
93 See Kentucky Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, Welcome, http://www.kcadp.org/ (last
visited Oct. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Welcome] (listing the organizations it works with to attaining its
political goals); KRS § 532.300.
94 KRS § 532.305. "KRS 532.300 shall not apply to sentences imposed prior to July
15, 1998." Id.
95 Welcome, supra note 95.
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justice.' 0 02 Neal claimed that opponents used "scare tactics" in an effort to
defeat the bill. 103
In the House, Crenshaw urged passage of the bill by reading a letter
from retired circuit court, Judge Benjamin Shobe, to the chair of the House
Judiciary Committee concerning the Racial Justice Act.' °4 In the letter,
Shobe, an African-American, argued that passage of the Act would increase
the perception of fairness in the death penalty procedures in Kentucky and
"erase the perception of minorities that they do not get a fair deal before the
courts."'0 5 He also rebutted claims that the bill would erase the death penalty
in Kentucky and that the procedures in the bill were onerous and costly, by
remarking, "Should prosecutors object to having their actions scrutinized to
determine whether they are free from untoward motivations? Of course not.
As a former prosecutor, I recognize the obligation of this officer to be
eminently fair. This legislation requires no more."l°06
The mechanics of the Act as approved are straightforward. At a pre-
trial conference, a defendant may allege that the prosecutor is seeking the
death penalty on the basis of race. 107 The defendant must present evidence
showing that racial considerations played a significant part in the
prosecution's decision to seek death in his case.108 Such evidence may
include statistical evidence or other evidence that a death sentence was
sought significantly more frequently either upon persons of one race than
upon persons of another race, or as punishment for capital offenses against
persons of one race than as punishment for capital offenses against persons
of another race.'09 The court will then schedule a hearing on the claim, and
declare a time for the submission of evidence by the parties."0  At the
hearing, the defendant bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that race was the basis of the Commonwealth's decision to seek the
death penalty."'1 The Commonwealth can offer rebuttal evidence. 112 Finally,
if the court finds that race was a basis of the decision to seek death, the court
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V. The Meaning of the Racial Justice Act
Kentucky's unique history with regard to race provided fertile
ground for this legislative achievement. Kentucky was likely the only death
penalty state that could claim that every single death sentence up to 1.996 was
for the murder of a white victim, despite the existence of over 1,000 black
murder victims during the same time. Kentucky's history of racial
discrimination in the criminal justice system is well-documented. For
example, in 1906 a black man was hanged immediately after an hour-long
trial for the rape of a white woman in Mayfield, Kentucky.114 An editorial in
the local newspaper, the Louisville Courier-Journal, observed that: "The
fact, however, that Kentucky was saved the mortification of a
lynching by an indignant multitude, bent upon avenging the innocent victim
of the crime, was matter for special congratulation."'" 5 The editorial noted
that, although the trial was hasty, "at least it was not a lynching."' 1 6 Adding
that since a Negro had raped a white woman, "no other result could have
been reached, however long the trial."' 17 Former Kentucky governor Edward
Breathitt stated:
As a young lawyer in Hopkinsville [the setting for Harper Lee's To
Kill A Mockingbird], I was distressed about the double standard of
justice in murder cases. If you were African-American and were
charged with killing a white person, justice was swift and severe
resulting in a death sentence. If you were a white person accused
of killing an African-American and could hire a good lawyer, you
had a good chance of being acquitted or receiving a light sentence.
If an African-American killed an African-American and the
accused was needed to cut tobacco or harvest a crop, justice
sometimes winked at the crime and allowed the defendant to be
freed to work for the white farmer."
8
Kentucky was also at the heart of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Batson v. Kentucky, in which the Court held that the removal of potential
jurors on the ground of race was unconstitutional and that prospective jurors
could only be removed on "race neutral" grounds. 19  In that case, the




"1 Richard H.C. Clay, President, Kentucky Bar Association, Speech to the Department of Public
Advocacy: Stamping Out All Vestiges of Racism in Our Justice System (June 15, 1998), http://dpa.state.
ky.us/library/advocate/sept98/racism.html.
"9 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all black persons on the
venire, and a jury composed only of white persons was selected.
20
There is something fascinating about a state scarred by a history of
racial discrimination against blacks leading an effort to make the capital
sentencing process more just for black Americans. Perhaps more
importantly, Kentucky's Racial Justice Act may suggest the imminent
abolishment of capital punishment in the United States. First, Kentucky's
passage of the Racial Justice Act may prompt other states to pass similar
legislation. Evidence from legislative work sessions in states like Nevada
suggests that as recently as 2002, other states had at least toyed with the idea
of enacting Racial Justice Acts. 12 1 Second, the fact that Kentucky passed a
Racial Justice Act bolsters the notion that the capital sentencing process in
the United States is fraught with discrimination and error-a notion
supported by numerous studies and championed by advocacy groups and the
American Bar Association for years.
For example, in 1990, a study by the U.S. General Accounting
Office found a pattern of discrimination in- death penalty cases based on
either the race of the victim, the race of the defendant, or both.
122
In 1994, the U.S. Senate ratified the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, a treaty that commits
signatory nations to eliminating laws which have the effect of continuing
racial discrimination. 123 It is important to note that effective discrimination is
significantly broader than intentional discrimination. While the latter
generally describes decisions made or policies enacted expressly on a
particular protected class, the former focuses on whether facially neutral
decisions or policies have a discriminatory effect, and bar them regardless of
whether the effect was intentional.
In February 1997, the American Bar Association passed a resolution
calling for a moratorium on the death penalty in the United States because
state authorities were failing to confront the role of racial bias and poverty in
application of the death penalty. 124  Since then, a number of state bar
120 Id. at 83.
121 Minutes of the Meeting of the Legislative Commission's Subcommittee to Study the Death
Penalty and Related DNA Testing, Jan. 24, 2002, Las Vegas, Nevada, http://www.leg.state.nv.us/71st/
Interim/Studies/DeathPenalty/MinuteslM-DeathPenalty-20020124-329.html.
122 Welcome, supra note 93; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING:
RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5 (1990), http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat 11/
141293.pdf.
123 International Commission of Jurists, Administration of the Death Penalty in the United States,
19 HUM. RTS. Q. 58-60 (1996).
124 Killing with Prejudice, supra note 53.
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associations have passed similar motions, including Connecticut, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania.
125
In June 1998, the Death Penalty Information Center reported two
studies on race and the death penalty. 26 One of the studies stated that the
odds of getting the death penalty in Philadelphia were nearly four times
higher if the defendant was African American. 27 The second study found
that decision-makers were a potential reason for this racial bias, because 98%
of the chief district attorneys in counties using the death penalty were white,
and only 1% black.'
28
Thus, Kentucky's response to discrimination in the capital
sentencing process serves as a reminder of all that is wrong with the death
penalty, and may fuel the movement to abolish it. One needs to look no
further than the legislative aftermath of the Racial Justice Act in Kentucky to
understand its possible impact nationally. In 1998, opponents of the Racial
Justice Act argued that the legislation would erase the death penalty in
Kentucky. The proponents rejected that prediction, labeling it a scare tactic.
However, the prediction opponents feared so much may become reality. In
February 2005, legislation was introduced in the Kentucky House of
Representatives to abolish the death penalty completely. 29 The likelihood of
the bill's passage is slim. Whether or not the legislation passes in the 2005
legislative session, its advocates will likely persist in their efforts as they did
with the Racial Justice Act. The Racial Justice Act appears to have been part
of a larger political strategy to totally abolish the death penalty. Supporters
viewed the Racial Justice Act as a necessary bridge towards abolition.
Kentucky's Racial Justice Act may be properly viewed as an effort
to alter the mindset of people in Kentucky towards the death penalty. It not
only reminds people of the problems with capital punishment, but it also
suggests the futility of trying to create a perfectly fair system that eliminates
all discrimination and possibilities of error. Thus, it implies that abolition
may be the only alternative. In that sense, the real importance of the passage
of Kentucky's Racial Justice Act is its symbolism rather than its application.
In fact, Kentucky's Racial Justice Act is too young and there have been too
few capital cases since its passage to definitively judge its effectiveness. As
of this point, there is no indication of whether a claim has been brought or
decided under the RJA since its enactment in 1998. However, the Racial
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Justice Act symbolizes the perception that the death penalty, and perhaps the
entire criminal justice system, is unfair to minorities. It symbolizes the
notion that racial discrimination pervades the death penalty system in the
United States at every stage of the process. Finally, it symbolizes the
growing assertion that the only way to eradicate the racial bias in death
penalty procedures is to eradicate the death penalty completely.
VI. Conclusion
The Kentucky legislature took a bold step by passing the Racial
Justice Act in 1998. After failing to pass in Congress throughout the 1990s,
the legislation appeared dead. The RJA movement lost significant steam
when the Congressional Black Caucus consented to its removal from
President Clinton's 1994 crime bill. The outlook was particularly bleak in
light of the Republican revolution of the early 1990s, during which the GOP
took control of Congress for the first time in 60 years, and the subsequent
election of Republican President George W. Bush in 2000. Congressional
Republicans had strongly opposed the legislation. Yet the gloomy defeat of
the Racial Justice Act in Congress did not stand in the way of advocates in
Kentucky as they persevered towards legislative triumph. When no other
state embraced this legislative effort to help eradicate racial bias in capital
sentencing, Kentucky did.

